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## Development Discourse and Policy Formulation in Global World

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### ABSTRACT

The idea of development has never belonged exclusively to the domain of the domestic politics. The famous Keynes–White debate, which structured much of the post-war global order, was in fact about ideas, policy mechanisms, and the processes through which ‘development’ could be brought about. Since then, there have been a large number of interrogations of all three: the idea, policy, and processes of ‘development’. However, time–space constraints preclude any detailed discussion of this thread of a rather rich literature. Suffice it to note that global political economy, until the 1980s, precluded any serious policy engagement across ideological as also systemic divides on this issue.

**Key Words:** *Development, idea, economy, politics, policy, world, market, discourse, space*

### INTRODUCTION

Discussions about socio-economic rights, which had been relegated until then to being an occasional demand of developing countries under the wider umbrella of New International Economic Order (NIEO), reemerged with the considerable changes in the global political economy since the 1980s. Changes in theorizations on state-market-society linkages under the garb of governance accompanied this new focus on socio-economic development at the global level. This discourse first appeared in a World Bank report [1], but it has since been challenged by various authors (such as Williams and Young [2], Jayal [3]) and its meaning has been repopulated by an equally robust body of literature, providing a useful point of reference for the present discussion of development.

This story also allows us to discuss another topic of importance to this piece: the inextricable bond between the international and Indian debates on progress. Although the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are two of the most influential global actors on development, they are often seen as being discursively de-linked, with the World Bank following a more economic thread of analysis and the UNDP being seen to follow a more 'holistic' and socially contextualised line of argument. The following passage does not go into the relationship between the World Bank and the UNDP, but it is evident that the World Bank has adopted the capabilities approach advocated by the UNDP through its Human Development Reports (HDRs).

The World Bank's policy suggestions and the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) worries about human development are more relevant to the article's focus on how India thinks about development. The debate that follows will make clear how both the UNDP and the World Bank's lines of argumentation have had a significant impact on the academic literature and the official planning apparatus in India.

The fact that governance is becoming the pivotal notion in many studies of development in India is also a compelling one. And as we'll see in the following section, governance is undeniably a worldwide debate that plays out in specific communities everywhere.

### Literature Review

In the 1990s, many people believed that the end of the developing state had arrived and that the main ideological and practical war had been won with the fall of the Soviet Union. However, 'governance reform' pushed by the World Bank in the early 1990s was quickly criticised for not considering the possibility of market failure (in addition to 'state failure,' which the market was supposed to address). Many criticisms of the World Bank's governance agenda raised serious questions about the model of development advocated by the Washington Consensus [4] and its impact on the developmental experience of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America [5,2,3].

Within the liberal school of thought, other researchers began to reevaluate the state's function: "from anti-market, via market-conforming, to market-friendly, the state is now considered more positively, if cautiously so." There has been a movement in the analytical focus away from viewing the market and the state as straightforward good and terrible alternatives. (Fine 1999: 1). Several studies published in the late 1990s questioned the efficacy of the state and the market as allocative processes, adding to the growing complexity of the state's role in growth. Development analysts and practitioners refocused their attention on society as the foundation of their work. Many researchers have examined civil society and social capital as significant anchors of growth after being encouraged by Robert Putnam et al [6] examination of the function of civic organisations in Italy [7,8,9,10], amongst many others).

The developmental discourse of the early 21st century is characterised by a lack of coherence and a focus on conflicting priorities, particularly with regard to the fundamental premises of the state-market relationship and the main anchor of development, apart from the societal location of such development. Despite the fact that 'progress' is today characterised by result indicators like literacy rates, health goals, employment rates, etc., the definition of 'development' has strangely escaped most analysts' attention. To hear the mainstream view, any and all changes to the social and economic order can be summed up as "development," and if further clarification is required, a simple neologism may be coined to do the job. For example, the meaning and link of "human development" to "development" have received little critical attention; the prefix "human" appears to have been taken as meaningless.

The concept of entitlement has also emerged as an important part of the development discourse in the new millennium. The concept of entitlement is multifaceted, with roots in the work of Amartya Sen among others (an issue to which we shall return to later). It should not go unnoticed, however, because the newly mobilized marginalised sectors have been employing projectile reasoning in order to argue for a differentiated concept of "progress" in the context of the depoliticized development of the 1990s [3,11]. As a result, the previously global, universal concept of development narrows to focus on specific places and times: Somehow, the pace of progress for Dalits differs from that of tribes, rural areas from semi-urban centres, and so on. New political actors and forms of public authority, as well as new institutional structures, are created to anchor this diverse conception of growth, and this logic is politics. And the state emerges as a key player in both, providing a foundation for the many conceptions of development and the primary instruments for bringing them to fruition. The 1990s saw widespread exaggeration of reports predicting the end of the developing state.

Next, we'll examine how studies of India's development, and studies about India, mirror these trends while also revealing important knowledge gaps. It's time for a disclaimer now that we've gotten this far into the examination. These recurring themes are the backbone of this chapter's discussion, but they gloss over a critical, perhaps inextricably linked, topic: democracy. Since the 1990s, and especially over the past decade, 'Development and Democracy' programmes have been at the heart of much donor discourse. While democracy and its impact on progress will be touched on, they won't be the primary focus of this discussion. This method was chosen not as a statement on the significance of the democratic issue, but rather as a result of real-world constraints.

### **Development Discourse**

The enormous number of analysis on "progress" would impress any scholar with even a cursory check of the catalogue of any large library in the country (or indeed, any academic portal on the Internet, to invoke what appears to be the modern idiom of research amongst research students!). A deeper problem, though, also resides there. A closer examination reveals that in the vast amount of writings on 'development' offering all manner of cross-cutting and overlapping analysis, careful and deep analysis of something as vital for the country as 'development' may not actually be that large. This line of thinking stems from the fact that progress must be prioritised above a plethora of interrelated but discrete concerns, such as democracy, participation, institution construction, and similar topics. These problems are interconnected yet distinct.

### **Modalities of Development**

The greatest allocative mechanism based on recent experience or conceptual articulations is only one aspect of a broader reevaluation of the role of state and market in socioeconomic transformation that occurred with the turn of the millennium. Amartya Sen's argument in 'Development as Freedom' [12] set the stage for a fresh perspective on the role of development in achieving human freedoms. According to Sen, "the value of wealth lies in the things that it permits us to do—the substantive freedoms it helps us attain... Improved quality of life and expanded freedoms should be the primary goals of development. (Ibid.: 14). Sen goes on to theorise many kinds of oppression and place emphasis on "...both the mechanisms that allow freedom of action and decision and the actual opportunities that people have, given their personal and societal situations..." (Ibid.: 17). As a result, expanding people's "capabilities" to live the kinds of lives they value is viewed as fundamental to protecting people's freedom. Public policy has the potential to improve people's ability to participate in decision making, but citizens can also shape policy outcomes via their own efforts. (Ibid.:18). The UNDP's adoption of the 'capabilities approach' to development analysis in its HDRs signalled the beginning of the approach's

meteoric rise to the forefront of much of the development advocacy and analysis community (for instance, Government of India [GoI] 2002).

Many other lines of inquiry into many fields of development studies and analyses have been generated by Amartya Sen's capability and entitlement approach. The shifting international political economics of development during the 1980s is a key factor in one school of thought within this type of study. In response to these shifts in the international economic system, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a declaration on the right to development in 1986. This document defined the right to development as "an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political development, in which all human right holders have an equal and essential role" [13]. This right encompasses all the rights guaranteed by both the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and each of these rights must be practised freely [14]. Despite the declaration's existence for over two decades, consensus among nations has been difficult to achieve, and no legal instruments exist to ensure that the rights outlined in it are really put into practise.

More talk than action has resulted from the declaration's influence on policy at the municipal level. Much of the discussion around human rights and development challenges centres on the concept of the right to development. Human rights approach to development is commonly used by professionals in the industry to describe the belief that "policies and institutions adopted for obtaining development should be established explicitly on the norms and principles given out in the international law on human rights...".

When duty holders are States acting collectively, or when developed States are viewed as duty-holders for meeting the entitlements held by the population of developing countries, the obligations of the duty holders become a crucial topic to comprehend. In a same vein, questions arise concerning the character of entitlements and duties in light of the fact that the RTD Declaration has defined the right as both an individual and a collective one.

Many other researchers have done the same thing, drawing on Sen's central formulations and occasionally developing them further so that they might be applied to analyses of specific industries or societal problems". Among these, probably the most prominent are analyses of gender concerns in development and studies of marginalised socioeconomic groups. Numerous academics have developed theories on Sen's writings from a feminist point of view [15,16]. As a result, most of India's development rhetoric revolves around received frames.

The problem of implementing preconceived notions is not exclusive to studies that focus on human development. This theme persists throughout the body of literature that places development firmly within a neo-liberal framework and places primacy on growth as the necessary prerequisite for 'development. From this perspective, the logic of economic expansion is able to solve many of the problems associated with progress. According to the World Development Report 2000/2001, "Attacking Poverty," growth is necessary to increase economic opportunities for the poor. How to attain quick, durable, pro-poor growth is an open question. Public and private investment can only be sustained with political and social stability and a business climate that encourages private investment and technological innovation. Furthermore, the rate of growth and the distribution of its advantages are both impacted by asset and social inequalities. Disagreements over who gets what out of economic progress are a threat to the peace and quiet that is essential to sustained expansion.

This school of thought uses circular reasoning to claim that growth is essential for resolving the problem of unequal progress on social concerns, which in turn needs to be resolved to ensure growth's sustainability. Once this premise is accepted, the literature from India in this school of thought does not question the underlying logic of growth but rather focuses on the obstacles to achieving the goal of a faster/higher rate of economic growth. One example is the claim made by Ahluwalia, who claims that "very little examination of how individual states have performed through time and the significance of state government policy in affecting state level performance..." [and that] plan also does not report the growth performance of different states in the past, nor assess the reasons for disparities in success between states' [17]. In a similar vein, Virmani contends that "government failure" is a much more serious problem than "market failure" and that a new paradigm is needed to address it at the start of the 21st century. To be specific, [18]. Accordingly, a series of policy reforms are advocated to produce a state that is market friendly (the attributes of such a state will be described later in the chapter) (the characteristics of such a state will be discussed later in the paper). The government's own resources must be allocated with a clear sense of priority in health and education and vital infrastructure development,...in backward areas,...' [19]. The federal and state governments must maximise the use of PPPs in other types of infrastructure. Delays in completing significant projects should be addressed as soon as possible. For instance, [20]. A substantial body of scholarship emphasises the connection between poverty and economic growth, defining 'development' narrowly to mean resolving inequalities in wealth distribution as a precondition for progress in that realm.

It is argued that "developing countries will be better able to reach sustainable growth and development trajectories"

if they focus on distributional aspects of development and find ways "to capture the inherently multidimensional and group based nature of inequality of opportunity". The global goal of development is the eradication of poverty in all its forms, and more equitable growth paths are more likely to accomplish this. (Ibid.: 22). Therefore, for this school of thinking, reform efforts centre on enacting a set of policies that ensures equality of opportunity, from freer markets and trade to judicial reform and beyond. The problem with these studies is that the goalposts keep moving, even if one accepts the line of reasoning behind this school of thought. To chase the mirage of 'progress,' policy prescriptions are added to a seemingly endless list.

The national five-year plans, possibly the most important document in India relating to development, have represented a mixture of these two strategies. Economic growth, according to the Tenth Five Year Plan, "cannot be the main objective for national planning," and "development objectives are being defined not merely in terms of gains in GDP or per capita income but more broader in terms of enhancement of human well-being." [21]. It goes on to say that progress should be measured by how well it utilises an economy's productive capacities, including both physical and human resources, to achieve its desired social purposes. Increasing the economy's growth rate is crucial for boosting its productive capacity. Therefore, it is crucial to follow a development plan that capitalises on synergies between economic expansion, desirable social achievements, and broadening access to opportunities (Ibid.: 56)

Accordingly, the NHDR draws its theoretical underpinnings and methodological framework from the UNDP's HDRs, but also includes insights from the economic growth school of development philosophy. As stated by its authors, the NHDR seeks to "create composite human development indices at the level of the states and encourage such efforts at the sub-state level" and "establish a consensus on the usage of the human development approach."

Indicators that help with 'assessment of the development process in terms of its overall influence on quality of life and standard-of-living of people' are given special attention in the NHDR. The report compiles measures of accomplishment in three "essential dimensions of well-being": longevity (defined as the ability to live a long and healthy life), education (defined as the ability to read, write, and acquire knowledge), and command over resources (the ability to enjoy a decent standard of living and have a socially meaningful life). Life expectancy at one year (rather than life expectancy at birth) and the infant mortality rate are two measures of longevity. The UNDP has shifted its focus from measuring adult literacy to measuring educational attainments, which now include both the rate of adults who are literate (7+) and the amount of formal schooling they have received. Infrastructure endowments like sanitation, jobs, housing, roads, electricity, and safe drinking water are also considered economic achievements together with actual consumption spending per capita after adjusting for inequality (ibid.: 23ff ).

The NHDR emphasises that the economic achievements of a society, as stated above, are not necessarily related to an individual's quality of life. The distribution of gains across geographic regions and socioeconomic groupings is even less directly related to economic growth. The paper states that there has been a recent trend in development literature away from focusing on only material results or means of development, and instead on 'outcomes that are either desirable in themselves or desirable because of their role in enabling greater chances for people' (Ibid.: 3). The problem with that is that it's very difficult to put numbers on things without introducing some subjectivity, which is exactly what this report does. While the non-economic components are emphasised conceptually in the NHDR, the NHDR, like other human development indexes, has trouble capturing them.

In total, the report compiles data on over 70 individual indicators across two or three time periods beginning in the 1980s. The Human Development Index (HDI), Human Poverty Index (HPI), and Gender Equality Index were all developed by the NHDR team using the aforementioned data collection (GEI). Using these metrics, the research reveals that while human development has generally advanced during the 1980s and 1990s, there are still large differences in human development between rural and urban areas, between the sexes, and between the states. The research itself acknowledges the indices' flaws, noting that the least developed states also score poorly on the HDI, whereas the middle-income nations do not. While these indices are excellent at distinguishing between the best and worst performing states, the fact that most states fall into the middle-income category severely limits its utility due to the lack of correspondence between economic development and HDI.

The paper promotes a governance strategy for human development, borrowing heavily from the UNDP's idea of governance. The framework also considers (a) institutions, (b) the delivery mechanism, and (c) the supportive and subordinate frame- work of rules, procedures, and legislation to be in constant dialogue with one another and with the governing body as a whole. Instead of providing a comprehensive framework for governance, this idea of governance, stripped of all political substance, proposes only minor adjustments to national-level structures and procedures. The report defines the role of the state as follows, which in turn sets the stage for future public policies for human development within the neo-liberal framework.

1. Defense, law and order, property rights and public health, macroeconomic management, perspective-building, and anticipatory and prospective tracking of the global economy are the bare minimums. Public investment in areas such as disaster assistance and anti-poverty programmes is also advised as a means of fostering greater equity.
2. There are two types of intermediate functions: those that deal with externalities (such as basic education and environmental preservation) and those that deal with monopolies (such as utility regulation and anti-trust laws) (insurance, financial regulation, and consumer protection). Through redistributive programmes like pensions, family benefits, and unemployment insurance, the state is seen as enhancing fairness in this capacity (Ibid.: 124).
3. As for the third category, "activist functions," it is generally agreed that the state's principal purpose is to coordinate private activity by promoting the market, and that equity is to be addressed by asset redistribution.

With this in mind, the NHDR advances a development strategy that draws from both the capability approach and the economic growth approach. The Eleventh Five Year Plan, the most recent strategy document, likewise emphasises "rapid growth is a key..." The government of India has stated that it wants to "restructure policies to achieve a new vision based on faster, more broad-based and inclusive growth... to reduce poverty and focus on bridging the various divides that continue to fragment our society". To achieve this goal, "the 11th Plan must aim at putting the economy on a sustainable growth trajectory with a growth rate of roughly 10%...by the end of the Plan period" (ibid.: 1). When the Eleventh Plan states, "monitoring and evaluation of government programmes is crucial to learn lessons about the design and implementation of programmes which can help increase their effectiveness... it is necessary to go from outlays and expenditures to final outcomes," it provides the foundation for the next thematic area of literature on development (Ibid.: 92).

Thus, very little can be seen in the analytic literature over the past decade that has theorised on the concept of development, its numerous interpretations, and its relevance to the state-market disputes. Unfortunately, this means that the discussion over traditional methods of development has also reached its conclusion in the Indian literature on the subject. It's possible that it's not an exaggeration to say that most of India's recent literature on development is reactive in nature, as it either adapts already-established conceptual frameworks to India's empirical reality or devotes itself to challenging those frameworks. In the past ten years, few alternative frameworks have emerged to question the concept of development. Minor adjustments are made to the frames that have been received, but otherwise the underlying models are not rethought. This section will focus on the vast body of work done to evaluate these models' efficacy.

### **Models of Development**

The topic of how to evaluate development progress remains unanswered, regardless of how much attention is paid to the details of what constitutes development, how it is achieved, how it is anchored in institutions, and how its effects are contested. There are many studies that focus on development, and they all have one thing in common: they all try to figure out how to measure outcomes and how to make delivery models more efficient. Examples include "aggregation and identification in the measuring of inequality and poverty" and "collective choice theoretic interpretations of the notion of libertarian and freedom-related rights." Assessment of poverty and inequality; "conceptual uncertainties, in the measurement of poverty..." [22]. Important studies can be found in this vein. While others try to appraise the Indian economy's progress toward economic reform and its place in the context of global political economy dynamics [23].

The business of development revolves around identifying problem areas and devising strategies to fix them [24]. Indeed, controversial definitions of development are often the result of such outcome-oriented examination of development processes. For this reason, it's not surprising that a huge body of research has converged on this line of inquiry; indeed, there are far too many studies for this list to be exhaustive even if we tried. Moreover, many analyses in the other themes rely very significantly on these outcome-oriented research (or the technique) to offer empirical basis for theorization in other streams.

In the past, economic expansion was the primary focus, with poverty alleviation as an afterthought; successes in areas like health and education were seen just as human capital resources. Writings by Amartya Sen and Mahbubul Haq, two prominent welfare economists, flipped conventional wisdom on its head. As stated by [25]. The UNDP HDRs, which have been published annually since the 1990s, advocate a human development strategy that "provided new tools to assess human development not merely in comparison to other nations but according to some agreed norms of achievements" (ibid.).

As a result, the essential failure of the old planned development paradigm is highlighted, and the focus shifts to the manifestation of disparities. Human development theory, in turn, places an emphasis on the mechanisms that lead to the development of capabilities, such as local governance mechanisms and social capital, both of which serve as overarching concerns in the study of how human development has progressed over time. Empirically based studies of development

are increasingly preoccupied with the new mechanisms of market-based tools and their efficacy in promoting human development. Accordingly, Shariff and Krishnaraj (Ibid.) provide a critical analysis of field data collected from 15 states across the country on a variety of human development indicators, including but not limited to literacy and enrolment rates, morbidity rates, household income, asset ownership, wages, and more. Dalits, adivasis, Muslims, and women, who are all marginalised in some way, receive extra help. There is also a significant amount of focus on developing more precise statistical and economic techniques for gauging human growth in a variety of geographical and social contexts.

Critical investigation of the delivery process, as well as the modifications to this process, under the new rethink on the mechanisms of delivery, has been an important strand of work within this output/outcome-oriented model of developmental analysis. Academics have put in a lot of thought and research into how to improve the delivery process. While specifics vary between industries, most analyses agree that change is difficult and that it "depends on contextual elements," such as the past reform ideas that have been tried, the state's ability to implement reform, the state's nature, and its relationships with key actors. Changing the environment by reshuffling the roles of major players and making necessary adjustments to perceptions and expectations is an essential aspect of any reform effort[26]. In this context, it's also important to remember that, despite the outcome-focused nature of the discussion in this body of work, most of the reform has been implemented through iterative learning rather than predetermined design. Another inconsistency for the sake of progress!

### **Issue of political mobilization**

It is not surprising that the matter of development has become a fundamental issue of political mobilisation and contestation between diverse politically engaged groups in India, where resources are hotly contested in what could be called a resource-deficit political economy. This fact, by itself, should not be a source of debate; after all, the liberal democratic process rests on the idea that people will act in their own best interests, and "progress" is surely one such interest. In fact, the universalist tone of liberal politics based on individuals' interests works quite well with the universalist assertion of socioeconomic transformation via the discourse of development. However, the universalistic promises of development are distinguished by socioeconomic groupings in much of the Indian analytical literature, both in the outcome-oriented studies analysed above and in those studies that analyse the methods by which the progress is "given" to the masses.

As a result, "...use of political power [state] to introduce change from above for the weaker section" is obviously seen as legitimate developmental politics, but the crux of the matter is in the fact that the "working of the state is analysed in the context of the society in which it is embedded, its ability to retain its autonomy in the face of powerful vested interests" [27]. Additionally, "the lack of an uprising from below inhibits the ability of enlightened political elites manning the progressive state to bring social change and benefit the poorer sectors of society" (ibid.). It has also been noted that bureaucracy's impacts are mediated by the institutional arrangement in which it is situated, which "conspire to turn bureaucracy against state coherence" and "may also begin to corrode the existing rule-following culture." With respect to the accumulation of state capacity, [the process of state construction] need not at all be linear and aggregative.

Redistributive measures for dalits and tribals, on the other hand, are challenging for a democratically elected government to implement in a time of rising democratisation and political competition [27]. This is so because efforts are put forth to guarantee that...these communities and groups are included at all stages of production and distribution, broadening the consumer pool and boosting people's skills. This is made feasible by luring individuals into the system and guaranteeing that all factions are represented in relevant bodies... To ensure the smooth operation of democratic capitalism, it is essential that all groups, privileged and otherwise, be adequately and proportionally represented in all spheres of society, including but not limited to public and private institutions of higher learning and employment, legislative and judicial bodies, and community councils and panchayats. According to [28].

The politics of recognition, which becomes entangled with the politics of redistribution, is an additional factor that intervenes in this context, alongside the cracks in the developmental and political process. The Indian political process has always been entangled with the dual goals of identity affirmation and social and economic transformation. In no way, shape, or form, can one be held responsible for the decline of the other. Much of India's democratic experience appears to be anchored in the intricate dynamics of the politics of identity and development. Public authority and the legitimacy of the political system are also put to the test [10]. In addition, some writers have analysed how religion is being used to set apart the overall concept of development [29]. Recent Hindutva mobilizations have been directed toward the development of a unique perspective on progress: "Though it [Hindutva articulation] asserts its developmental model to be holistic and inclusive, it does not have enough credibility and substantiation..." As it stands, non-Hindus are still excluded[30].

Differentiated conceptions of development outcomes, grounded on politics of recognition as the path to development, challenge the universality claims of the development rhetoric. The issue over whether this type of development

specialisation considerably changes the meaning of both the end result and the method remains open.

### **Forms and Processes of development**

Kohli has consistently analysed this topic over the past few decades, focusing on the state-market-society interaction and the position, role, and anchor of development within it. The topic of development and the state in India is still heavily influenced by his views [31].

Amongst the argument on various institutional types of development, the foremost for the past many decades has been the role that state and its agencies should play in socio-economic change. While this topic was a key point of contention in the earlier decades, since the 1990s and under the governance paradigm, the argument has switched to alternate and non-state actors as anchors of development. The fundamental subject of public policy as anchor of collective action for development cannot be overlooked, even though a number of authors have recently emphasised on such non-state actors' role, efficacy, and capacity to induce and sustain socio-economic change. Liberal economics advocates like Joseph Stiglitz [32] and others have been recently talking about a 'post-Washington Consensus,' which acknowledges the fundamental role of the state in maintaining public policy.

Instead of focusing on a debate between market- and state-led developments, the discussion on developmental states has shifted its focus to three main areas: (1) the importance of state intervention for economic success; (2) state-society links; (3) the capacities of the state or the state apparatus; and (4), less frequently, the capacities and characteristics of the private sector[33].

Due to India's unique political economy, the question of the state's involvement in the country's growth has persisted in academic analysis nearly without interruption throughout the literature on the country. Even more recent research has highlighted the '...state as the only social instrument possibly capable of defining universal obligations, implementing them, adjudicating disputes, and imposing redress and accountability. Therefore, the state is crucial to progress [34].

AtulKohli's study on state-directed development, which examines the experiences of four countries (South Korea, Brazil, India, and Nigeria), concludes that "the creation of successful states within the developing world has generally preceded the emergence of industrialising economies." The political and economic contexts in which individual citizens make choices have been profoundly impacted by established patterns of governmental authority. Drawing from a detailed comparative analysis of the four countries, Kohli identifies 'different patterns of state authority' (Ibid.: 9) and then traces the impact of those variations on economic outcomes and probes the origins of the varying state types, which have been identified as neo-patrimonial states, cohesive-capitalist states, and fragmented-multiclass states. Kohli goes on to underline the important role of India's fragmented-multiclass state on patterns of industrialization and development. Indian state sometimes lacked the political capability to translate its enormous economic objectives into outcomes, while having many features of a modern state, such as control over territory and providing some degree of political stability. Central to this incapacity is its splintered authority, defined by both intra-elite and elite-mass schisms and ruling coalitions that are generally multiclass. Rather than focusing on whether or not their economic policies will bring quick industrialization and progress, the leaders of such a state are always concerned with whether or not they will aid to consolidate their political position. (Ibid.: 286-7)

To better understand the causes of the widening gap in India's socioeconomic growth, it's important to examine the connection between political system and developmental outcomes. State politics and development dynamics mediate the shifts in "economic and political power of corporate groupings within India", with "different politics and authority structures among Indian states" (Ibid.) determining regional developmental dynamics (Ibid. : 18).

This varied understanding of the role of Indian state in development has also been explored from the viewpoint of developmental decision- making, grounded as it is in the plurality of outcomes at the subnational level. In recent years, the conventional notion of the Indian state as a powerful entity providing resources and directing growth has been reexamined. The "Indian state is a divided leviathan; its regional states' acts have startling and tremendous ramifications," as one author put it [35]. In order to support his claim that "diversity of institutions and trajectories, not uniformity and hierarchy,"Sinha analyses the similarities and differences between three different states. (Ibid., p. 263) describe India's recent development history. The study also indicates that contrary to the foundations of neo-liberal methods wherein the market mechanism will gradually supplant the state in making developmental allocations, the developmental state continues at various levels, policy alterations notwithstanding. However, the political mobilisation and context of such policy choices at the subnational level can lead to a variety of outcomes.

Another feature of the heterogeneity of the development experience of India is the ongoing comparison with the achievements of the 'developmental' state in China—a subject of much criticism in the popular economic, media and literature. Engaging with the political economy of development, Bardhan [36] undertakes a brief comparative political

economy analysis of the recent patterns in these two large countries to argue that 'democracy...unleashes both positive and negative forces for development', while there is 'tension between the participatory and procedural aspects of democracy in matters of governance as well as economic management, and yet authoritarianism is neither necessary nor sufficient for development' (Ibid.: 17). (Ibid.: 17). While China is regarded to have superior delivery of services thanks to its successful model of decentralisation, India's aggressive electoral democracy has managed to focus political actors' attention on delivery deficiency issues. In the case of India, the decentralisation policies introduced practically simultaneously with economic reforms remain generally ineffectual in assuring a better development delivery model, save in a select few states of the Union. 'The slowly rising importance of development governance and a little increase in political coherence in recent electoral results are hopeful straws in the wind' (Ibid.: 159). (Ibid.: 159).

It is perhaps not surprising that many hopes have been pinned on a relatively new set of institutions, the panchayats, given the growing importance of subnational structures in anchoring the developmental agenda. While panchayats as a statement of will have been present for a long time, it is not incorrect to argue that panchayats as institutions of local governance evolved only after the Seventy-second and Seventy-third Amendments to the Constitution in 1992. Young panchayats have a lot riding on them since they are perceived as institutions of local democracy and, possibly because of that label, as anchors of socioeconomic progress. The powers and duties granted to the panchayats under Article 243G of the Constitution of India should put to rest any scepticism about the panchayats' intended role. Indeed, panchayats were thought of as institutions that promoted progress and societal transformation. Because of their key role in the local resource environment, the panchayats' style of operation in the local political economy is of paramount importance. Therefore, the scholarly literature has focused on redistributive impact, participation of weaker sections and women and their empowerment, market-oriented efficacy, resource autonomy and/or dependence on the state governments, fiscal strength, and many other aspects of institutional design and political processes that structure the functioning of these institutions [37,38,39,26]. Decentralization, the process that underpins development, and the processes that enable marginalised groups to participate in and exert influence on the institutions of local governance, have also received much study. Furthermore, problems with panchayat fiscal consolidation and the mechanisms through which the poorest members of society gain access to and influence the distribution of development funds are dissected and discussed [40,41,42]. From Dalit identity and development to the impact of women's participation on panchayats and developmental outcomes, from panchayats as the third tier of Indian federalism to fiscal issues facing them, and many such thematics, many of these analyses and writings engage with the complex dynamics of both local governance and development [43]. Some academics have looked at the international experience to analyse the "political context of decentralisation...[the processes through which] the context shaped the way that decentralisation evolved, and... the potential equity and efficiency effects..." due to the significance of local governance institutions in India's politics of development[44].

New institutional forms have begun to inhabit local areas, and this has been the subject of some of the most recent research on the causes and consequences of development. The term "civil society" is used to refer to a broad category that includes many different types of new institutions. Many development professionals and some analysts view civil society as a place where morality can be displayed. Critical analysis of civil society actors has, therefore, generally focused on their role in democratization, political process, and its relationship to citizenship [45,46]. Though acknowledged, the developmental function of civil society actors has been the focus of far less critical analysis, save as a policy prescription in official reports and publications of multilateral and donor organisations (for instance, [37]). The crucial part that civil society actor's play in development, which has been the subject of some research, is often overlooked [47].

### **Comparative Development Discourse**

To what extent do economic policy designs evolve more rapidly than, say, Paris and Milan's latest fashions... This may seem like an absurd comparison, but a look back at the concepts that drove economic changes reveals that they were as fleeting as the length of skirts and the width of ties. The key difference is that economic policy trends have a far-reaching impact on the quality of life for millions of people and the prospects for the next generation.

There has always been a great deal of irrationality around the factors that are thought to contribute to a nation's prosperity. Academics, legislators, and the more enlightened parts of the global populace have always had wildly divergent and unpredictable policy recommendations, and the recent decade was no exception. But the 1990s were unique in one important way: everyone thought that by then, there was a solid agreement on how developing nations should help themselves prosper[48].

The analytical literature on India can be found within the 'global consensus' on development. Much of the Bretton Woods order since World War II is based on arguments over development, as was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, and the 'politics of development' provides the sole useful lens through which to analyse a substantial chunk of postcolonial international relations. While 'development' may not have been a worldwide concern (by evident necessity, 'development' had to be local), global politics has had 'development' as a core pillar of international politics.

It is within this frame that the evolution of development discourse must be located.

The Keynesian compromise reached at the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, which asserted and acknowledged the right of member governments to exercise control over macroeconomic management, and which also agreed that all efforts must be made to ensure a progressively freer global trade regime, gave rise to a new global discourse on development in the 1950s. The reason for this agreement was that the vagaries of international finance markets could not be permitted to undermine the policy autonomy of the emerging post-war welfare states for development.

Requirements of huge sums to finance post-war reconstruction in Europe were reflected in the prevailing policy consensus of the time. Development discourse at the time, which was deeply embedded in the modernization paradigm, maintained that such reconstruction required governmental measures to facilitate a quick movement of capital and technology to Europe to aid swift reconstruction. Furthermore, as decolonization gathered momentum, the modernization paradigm suggested that a similar movement of capital and technology to newly decolonized underdeveloped countries would bring about their development. It was believed that technologically sound "projects" were the means by which development goals could be attained. Public entities were given the task of enacting developmental programmes 'for the people,' but little weight was given to the importance of the local context. Community development projects at the time were widespread in India, and they mostly complied with the policy suggestions of the preexisting development discourse.

By the middle of the 1960s, critics had pointed out that the project style of implementing development programmes had resulted in the establishment of 'enclaves of development,' or regions that had grown at a higher rate than the rest of the country. The need for better coordination and management of development programmes led to a focus on decentralising authority to lower levels of government organisation and a broader sectoral orientation with integrated developmental initiatives. During this time, "programme" was the buzzword, and "development of the people" was the paradigm for achieving progress. It is no accident that the Indian development process has shifted toward integrated schemes like the Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS), which was initiated in 1975, and the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), which was initiated in the 1990s (the complex political economy of 1970s meant that IRDP was not formally launched until 1980).

In the late 1970s, experts focused on Africa, where governments were unable to effectively manage developmental duties. The relative role of the state and the market mechanism in fostering development was debated in the 1980s as experts pointed out the state's technological incapacity and bureaucratic flaws. As a result, a focus has shifted toward exploring potential "policy" responses that can provide incentives for progress. Since the prevailing development model at the time aimed to incorporate market mechanisms into development processes, structural adjustment reforms became pivotal in releasing state-controlled resources for use by private organisations. People-centered development was considered as the driving force behind these initiatives. As a result, liberalisation policies in India emerged in the early 1980s and fully materialised in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

In the 1990s, it became increasingly clear that 'politics' — not just projects, programmes, and policies — occupied a central place in the process of development. Success of developmental initiatives depends not just on technocratically sound models and programmes, but also equally, if not more, on the political context, and the previous trend of treating development as apolitical was called into question in recent decades. As a result, the catchphrase of development experts became "Getting Politics Right." As a result, a number of organisations providing developmental aid began to challenge the idea of state sovereignty, leading them to push a 'governance and democracy' agenda. The new governance approach to developmental analysis has been praised for its focus on the urgent need to establish and maintain trustworthy institutions at the local level, even if many of its components have been criticised. The paradigm of the 1990s emphasised development 'by the people,' which meant that such institutions were seen as crucial for developing a bottom-up approach to development (to replace the top-down model of the last half-century). Given the focus placed in this paradigm on people control of the development mechanisms, it is necessary to untangle what is meant by "governance" in this context.

The focus shifted at the turn of the 2000 to human development, with so-called "civil society organisations" (CSOs) considered as important in making this happen. Planners for India's economic and social progress advocated decentralisation policies and enlisted the nonprofit sector as a cog in their development machinery at this time.

Accordingly, the development paradigm in India has shifted in a way that is highly congruent with the international norm. India's current developmental philosophy and practise is an integral component of the worldwide conversation because of its continued connection to international developments. Here, it's worth noting that this fusion of Indian and international development thought is one reason why India is a difficult market for multilateral or intergovernmental organisations to ignore when allocating developmental financing.

Having said that, it is important to keep in mind a few counter-trends when examining Indian development theory and practise. These contrasting tendencies are significant because of the confirmation they provide that global development is a priority and because they highlight the policy space still available to states despite the spread of globalization. As a first point, the Indian development process showed traces of what can only be called neo-Keynesism when the global development debate was still discussing the pros and disadvantages, benefits and demerits of neo-liberalism-induced falling role of the state. Even though the neoliberal developmental consensus supported complete decontrol of capital flows up until 2008, the Indian state actually only partially relaxed its grip on the market all that time. Indian development thinking has always been in favour of neo-Keynesian policies, which were adopted by many states in the Global North after the 2008 financial crisis prompted a rethink of the neo-liberal consensus on this issue.

Second, it's important to remember that in 2005, India launched the National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme, even though the global developmental discourse was openly advocating for the use of the market and civil society as mechanisms of implementing development. The fact that it is state-sponsored and -run makes it anathema to the principles of international cooperation in development. In addition, although the international consensus places more emphasis on non-state and corporate players, the Indian developmental policy uses locally created political governance systems as its anchors.

It's possible that some of these tendencies are at odds with the current conversation about international progress. Some of these policy actions and discursive oddities, however, may be anticipating changes in international discourse. Which of these two trends will become increasingly noticeable in the 'development' sector's (academic and practitioner) experience in the years to come?

## CONCLUSION

When analysing something like development, which is, if anything, a "work in progress," at both the national and global levels, it may be fruitless to talk of a conclusion. Therefore, it could be preferable to undertake an exploration of consonance and dissonance between India and the world with a view to explore prospective routes that may be inhabited by the study foci of some of the studies in the recent future than to attempt crystal ball gazing. This survey of key analytical anchors in the Indian discourse on development reveals intriguing trends and opens up avenues for further investigation.

One trend that probably doesn't need to be overstated is the intimate connection between developmental analysis in Indian academic and policy literature and current analytical concerns around the world. This is both an advantage and a continuing source of worry. The literature in Indian universities is on par with that of universities throughout the world, conceptually speaking, and there is very little in the way of a discursive divide between the two. On the other hand, the extent to which Indian analysis conforms to accepted frames is highlighted by this web of scholarly ties. Taking part in preexisting frameworks might not be a bad thing if it leads to new lines of thinking that push against the limits of our current conceptions of how progress is made. Unfortunately, the level of involvement is low. Instead of making an effort to reinterpret received frames in light of peculiarities of India's empirical experience of development, the received frames are typically applied directly to Indian empirical reality.

In view of the foregoing, it is maybe not too much to hope that some of the experts, including the author, will engage in a more fundamental investigation of the concept, premises, institutional anchoring, and policy frames of "development." It would seem that Indian academic discourse cannot go beyond its path dependence of evaluating, verifying, or disputing conventional frames unless such an endeavour reaches a critical mass. Only when original thought and analysis receive adequate attention in terms of both intellectual focus and institutional backing can a critical mass form.

One connected problem is the developmental literature's persistent reliance on the Global North for paradigms and analytical frameworks. Little attention is paid to the development- opment studies coming out of the Global South, especially the experience of Latin America, which has, arguably, greater relevance to the difficulties facing the country than the issues facing the North. This problem may be due to language barriers, but it could also be a result of our aspiration to be recognised as a major player in international affairs, in which the Global South is something we have long since abandoned (or, perhaps, wish to disassociate ourselves from in the pursuit of a seat at the High Table in the 'new' emerging global order). However, literature from both Asia and Africa must be considered in any examination of India's growth. This is a major hole in Indian development discourse, which is exacerbated by the fact that the more established Indian developmental literature is often cited to explain the flaws in the North's approach, while more recent analysts are often eager to adopt the same approach. It's time to put in the mental effort to reorient our research agendas toward more critical and holistic analytical frameworks.

Another noteworthy trend is the prevalence of development studies that adhere to what was previously referred to as the outcome-oriented analysis. There is no denying the importance of such research, but with few notable exceptions, the next leap of faith—using these outcome-oriented analyses to reconstitute categories of analysis—is not noticeable.

Finally, it's worth noting that the evolution of the analysis allows for a good deal of conceptual flexibility. This flexibility may have its roots in the aforementioned issues, but it ultimately leads to fresh complications. Analysis of development often encompasses a wide range of topics, from gender equality to minority rights to political mobilisation to close institutional gaps. All of these problems are interconnected, to be sure, but the mental bridges between them are often taken for granted rather than defined. In order to give these assumed connections the intellectual and institutional attention they deserve, they must be populated with lively debates.

Despite these challenges, most Indian analysts are looking forward to the Indian empirical experience of its engagement with 'development' making significant contributions to the global discourse on development.

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